Warum in die Luft sprengen, was man einfach umprogrammieren kann?

Malworm Stuxnet Proved More Destructive than a Conventional Attack

Denn anders als im Westen bisher groß thematisiert hat Stuxnet sich nicht nur des iranischen Atomprogramms angenommen, sondern offenbar weit größeren Appetit gezeigt:

1. The attack has focused on Iran’s nuclear and military resources – less on civilian infrastructure. The concealed projects of Iran’s nuclear weapons program have, in particular, been either partially damaged and would meet the conventional military definition of „temporarily out of action,“ or so immobilized as to require many months, perhaps more than a year, before they are restored to even partial operation.

2. Most of Iran’s key military facilities, including the nuclear laboratories in North Tehran, the atomic reactor in Bushehr, the uranium enrichment plants in Natanz and the thousands of centrifuges spinning there, are gravely disabled and working at minimal capacity.

3. Some of Iran’s military command and control centers at military and Revolutionary Guards Corps headquarters are shut down, along with field command centers for ballistic missile batteries, key airbases, air defenses and navy. […] A high-ranking Persian Gulf official remarked that an enemy attack in the last two weeks would have found Iran virtually stripped of its defenses. […]

4. The most serious impairment has been suffered by the military industrial giants, which are relied on in emergencies to keep up a rapid supply of munitions and replacement parts to the military and Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) units, DEBKA-Net-Weekly’s intelligence sources report. Hundreds of these plants are near breakdown. […]

5. Intelligence sources familiar with IRGC operations report severe damage to the command centers and training facilities the Al Qods Brigades runs for foreign terrorists, as part of its external clandestine and terror-sponsoring mission. Its facilities are forced to operate now at sub-optimal capacity.

6. Iran’s key power grid, pumping and water supply stations, the computers controlling public transport, including railways, and the haulage companies serving major Iranian cities, have been marginally affected. […] These minor hitches appear designed to give Tehran a broad idea of the wholesale paralysis awaiting Iran if the operators of Stuxnet take their attack to a higher level.

7. At the end of last week, the Iranians reported 30,000 of their computers had been affected. Monday, September 27, some Iranian sources were talking about 45,000, including 30,000 in the Bushehr nuclear reactor and military facilities alone. […] In reality, Western intelligence calculates that millions of computer systems and personal computers were struck. […]

8. Iran has taken a huge intelligence setback from this digital invasion aside from the physical damage. DEBKA-Net-Weekly’s intelligence sources report that no one aside from its programmers can tell how much intelligence data the Staxnet raiders extracted from Iran’s military, intelligence and industrial computer systems before they were discovered. […]

Das beste aber ist, daß die unter Punkt 3 genannte Wirkung weitreichende Folgen für die Möglichkeiten des iranische Regimes haben könnte, mit militärischen Mitteln weitere Unruhe zu stiften:

[…] the only way to find out if their missile batteries are infected by Stuxnet – or „the son of Stuxnet“ is to activate the firing mechanisms of every one of those missiles, thereby destroying their entire stock and remaining defenseless. The same predicament applies equally to Syria and Hizballah.

Womit endlich mal eine brauchbare Alternative zur Hard Power aufgezeigt worden wäre. Allerdings heißt die nicht Soft Power. Sondern Software Power.